Jackie Clews

Presidential elections have a long history of miscounted votes. From hanging chads to dead people voting, votes have been notoriously skewed in many elections nationwide.

As technology improves, so do different voting techniques in hopes to curb voting discrepancies. One proposed idea has been to use the Internet to vote based on the theory that not only will more people vote, but security will also improve. This idea has garnered a surprising amount of support.

A recent poll on MSNBC asked Internet users if they would trust their vote to the Internet. Surprisingly, 29 percent said “yes,” 39 percent said “not today, but maybe soon,” 35 percents said “never” and 3 percent said “none of the above.”

Unfortunately, Internet voting is not at secure as many people believe.

In a doctoral program at Princeton University, professor Edward W. Felten and his students Ariel J. Feldman and J. Alex Halderman demonstrated how to create a virus to alter votes. By replacing the original memory card with the memory card that included the virus, votes could be stolen. The students created two hypothetical candidates and voted 4-1, but the results on the final printout and the memory card with the virus recorded 2-3. The total number of votes was the same, even though they were distributed differently.

In addition, the experimenters were able to use the virus to erase all traces of altered results and make the virus almost impossible to detect. Even when workers at voting polls test the machines, the viruses can be set to detect when the machine is in a pretend election and fool workers into thinking votes are being recorded correctly.

In a similar case in 2001, computer programmer Clinton Eugene Curtis testified under oath to U.S. House Judiciary Members in Ohio. He alleged in 2000, Congressman Tom Feeney hired him to build a prototype software package to rig the Florida presidential election results to 51-49. According to Curtis, Feeney was the Speaker of the House for Florida a registered lobbyist for Yang Enterprises Inc. (YEI) — a company that sells voting machines and also YEI’s corporate attorney at the time. A conflict of interest, maybe?

While Curtis’ allegations have never been proven true in a court of law, his testimony is a point of interest.

The ex-employee of NASA told the judge almost anyone can rig an election. However, Curtis said even he was not sure he would be able to detect a fixed election.

“If you get the machines, and they have not been passed yet … then you would have to take machines and decompile them, which I can’t do, but maybe an MIT or Microsoft [employee] could do, then you might, you might be able to see it. It depends on how good they are at destroying what they had … you can make the code actually eat itself,” Curtis said.

Although computers may look more appealing than paper, people should consider the security risk and cost that come with new voting technology.

Luckily, Oklahoma has not considered moving to computers for the November 2008 presidential election. Oklahoma plans to use optical scan voting machines, which are designed like lottery tickets. With a pencil, voters simply darken the bubble next to the candidate for which they wish to vote. Unlike on a computer, where a hacker can plant a virus to skew others’ votes, voters only get one paper ballot, which makes it more difficult to change other people's votes.

Optical scan voting is more secure than new voting technology, such as touch screens and direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines.

A polling center with three DRE voting machines and VVPB printers is estimated to cost about $24,000. In contrast, a polling center with three voting stations that include a ballot marking device, a polling place optical scanner and fold-up voting booths, the total cost is estimated to be only $10,250, according to the New Yorkers for Verified Voting Web site.

The presidential election this November is important to many Americans, and those people have the right to have their votes recorded accurately.

Events such as a 2006 Congressional election in Florida in Sarasota County, prove the risks taken with new voting technology.

“One in seven voters using the direct recording electronic (DRE) machines did not have their preferences recorded,” said Aviel D. Rubin, professor of computer science, to the U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government.

One way to make sure votes are recorded accurately is to implement Voter Verified Paper Records (VVPRs). This would allow voters to make sure their votes were recorded accurately and could also be used in the event of a recount.

Even if they did have VVPRs, however, a study reviewed by The Washington Post showed that “the verification systems didn’t significantly cut the error rate of DREs and often caused confusion and prompted voters to seek help from poll workers.” This study was published in “Voting Technology: The Not-so-Simple Act of Casting a Ballot.”

So, why spend more money just to take a bigger risk?

Jackie Clews is a journalism sophomore.